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There is much evidence against the so-called "too big to fail" hypothesis in the case of 
bailouts to sub-national governments. We look at a model where districts of different size 
provide local public goods with positive spillovers. Matching grants of a central government 
can induce socially-efficient provision, but districts can still exploit the intervening central 
government by inducing direct financing. We show that the ability of a district to induce a 
bailout from the central government and district size are negatively correlated. 
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There is much evidence supporting the conjecture that the occurrence of bailouts to
sub-national governments in general contradicts the so-called "too big to fail" hy-
pothesis1. A rst example is that, based on the constitutional principle of uniformity
of living conditions throughout the nation, the German federal court supported in
1992 the claims of the two smallest state governments in terms of population, Bre-
men and Saarland, in pursuing the federal government to support them in coping
with their excessive public debt and unusual high ratio of interest payments to total
expenditures, which together with the poor economic performance, could set the ba-
sic supply of local public services under risk (Seitz, 1999). At the beginning of the
1990s, the health system in Italy2 faced in small and poor regions in the south of the
country a decit of about 15% and the central government stepped in and covered
the decits thus incurred to prevent health care in these regions break down (von
Hagen et al, 2000). In Sweden, the central government was empowered by law during
the period 1974-1992, to provide discretionary transfers to support municipalities in
nancial distress3. Econometric evidence for this period (Dahlberg and Pettersson,
2003), shows that population size and density have a signicant negative association
with realized bailouts and accumulation of municipal debt. On the other hand, the
1It is important to point out that we are not interested in episodes of generalized bailouts like,
for example, the rescue operation implemented by the federal government in Mexico early after the
nancial crisis in December 1994 which included extraordinary transfers to all state governments.
Another example is Brazil, where the federal government assumed all state and municipal debt in
1993 and 1997 (Dillinger and Webb, 1998).
2In 1992, ordinary regions spent 71% of their total resources on health services. Almost 96% of
their revenues came from central government (matching) grants. (von Hagen et al, 2000).
3This relief program was not part of a regular intergovernmental transfer scheme (von Hagen et
al, 2000).
2recent scal crisis faced by the city of Philadelphia in the US in 1990 cannot be con-
sidered a case of bailout since the scal cost of the crisis was mainly internalized by
its residents living with reduced public services, additional sales tax and city workers
facing a wage freeze and a reduction in employee benets (Inman 1995).
Also in Latin America, a number of recent experiences in Argentina, Colombia
and Costa Rica contradict the "too big to fail" hypothesis. In Argentina for example,
the central government has often used extraordinary resources to face scal and
nancial crises at provincial level since the return of democracy in 1983. In general,
they took place in jurisdictions with the lowest level of GDP and which are among
the smallest in terms of population4 (Nicollini et al, 2002).
This paper investigates the ability and willingness of local governments to induce a
central government to directly nance the provision of the local public goods, i.e. to
induce bailouts5. Size dierences among local jurisdictions play an important role
in this paper. The paper`s take is that, in a federation with lower-level governments
of dierent size providing local public goods, the ability of a district to induce a
bailout depends negatively on its size. This line of research is pioneered by Wildasin
(1997), who develops a model where externalities in the provision of local public
goods explain the allocation of bailouts among jurisdictions. In clear contrast to
4Bailout episodes during the 1990s include the provinces of Jujuy, La Rioja, Tucuman, Cata-
marca, Corrientes, Santiago del Estero and Rio Negro which are the smallest in terms of population
if we exclude the extremely sparsely populated and oil producing provinces in Patagonia in the south
of the country. Moreover, these provinces together represent less than 13% of the total population
and less that 10% of national GDP.
5Although not discussing size eects, recent literature on soft budget constraints and bailouts also
include: Qian and Roland (1998), Inman (2001), Goodspeed (2002) and Sanguinetti and Tommasi
(2002). See also Kornai (1986), who introduces the discussion on soft budget constraints in the
study of state-owned enterprises, and Maskin (1999) for a survey.
3our results, he nds that the size of a subnational jurisdiction positively aects its
likelihood of demand and obtaining a bailout.
We develop a two-tier hierarchy model with the central government at the top
and several jurisdictions of dierent size at the bottom that provide local public
goods6. We assume that there are economies of scale and (positive) externalities
in the provision of public goods. As in for example Alesina and Spolaore (1997),
economies of scale are modelled with a xed cost associated with public goods' pro-
vision. Furthermore, the spillover eect is modelled in a similar way as Besley and
Coate (2003), that is, public goods provided in a district do not only benet individ-
uals in this particular district, but also entail a positive externality for individuals
in other districts.
The paper starts with looking at the non-cooperative outcome in Section 2. Indi-
viduals choose the optimal amount of public goods to be provided in their district.
It follows that districts only provide local public goods when district size is large
enough relatively to the economies of scale eect in local public good provision. A
common nding in this form of decision making is, however, that the spillover eect
is not taken into account and, therefore, underprovision of local public goods occur.
Section 3 characterizes the optimal level of local public goods provision and denes a
system of matching grants implemented by a central government that can be used to
achieve an ecient outcome without completely centralizing decision making. Not
only is the (strictly positive) amount of public goods provided in a non-cooperative
6Throughout this paper we write public goods though, strictly speaking, we mean publicly
provided goods.
4Nash equilibrium lower than the level in an ecient outcome, also in less cases than
socially optimal, local public goods are provided when district size is small relative
to the economies of scale in local public goods provision.
The paper then shifts attention to the issue of soft budget constraints. In Sec-
tion 4, it analyzes whether and when the central government is willing to make an
extraordinary transfer (bailout) to a district, which decides to underprovide local
public goods. It turns out that the willingness of the central government to provide
a bailout depends negatively on the size of the jurisdiction. In addition to that, since
the amount of public goods provided under the bailout policy is lower than that in
an ecient outcome, it is costly for individuals to induce a bailout - in case of a
bailout there will be less local public goods in their districts than they are willing
to pay for. For that reason, the central government's bailout policy does not fully
characterize the occurrence of bailouts. Subsequently, the conditions under which lo-
cal governments indeed choose to induce such a bailout are identied. In agreement
with the empirical evidence, as jurisdiction size decreases, the bailout becomes in
general more attractive for a jurisdiction, and the willingness of a local government
to induce a bailout increases. In Section 5 we argue that these bailout policies can be
the strategies in a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. Finally, Section 6 summarizes
and concludes.
52 The non-cooperative equilibrium
Suppose that a country is divided in N districts of dierent size. The country has a
population of N individuals and each district i has a population of ni, where ni < N=2
for all districts. Each individual has an endowment y and there are two types of goods
in the economy, a private good x and a public good g. To simplify notation and to
show that the results do not depend on heterogeneity among individuals, we assume
that all individuals have identical preferences and endowments. We assume that an
individual's payo is quasilinear in the endowment and that the utility function is
additively separable.
We assume that there are economies of scale in public good provision. This feature
is modelled with a xed cost F for providing public goods, regardless of the size of
the region. There is also a variable cost that depends on the exact amount of public
goods that individuals want to provide. A district i provides per capita an amount
gi of the local public goods and each individual in district i pays a lump-sum district
tax ti to nance public good provision in district i. If a district provides an amount
gi of the public good then individuals in this district will get a benet v(gi) from
these public goods. We assume that v(:) is strictly concave, that v0(:) > 0 and that
v(0) = 0. An individual, however, does not only get a payo from the public good
in his own district but also from the public goods in all other districts. The degree
of this (positive) spillover eect is denoted by , 0 <  < 1, so that an individual in
district i gets a benet v(gj) of the public goods provided in district j, (i 6= j) 7.
7The main argument behind the "too big to fail" hypothesis is that spillovers are important and
increasing in district size. This is for example the case when the spillover eect is proportional to
6To illustrate this consider two examples, health care and education. An individ-
ual in the rst place benets from vaccinations and basic literacy in his own district.
There are, however, diminishing returns since an individual benets less from say
plastic surgery or some forms of university education. In the second place an indi-
vidual also indirectly benets from these goods provided in other districts. since an
individual may sometimes interact with individuals from other districts, and the pro-
vision of public goods there make these interactions more benecial. In these cases,
the economies of scale in public good provision, represented by the xed costs, is for
example a single bureaucracy that is responsible for health care and education in
each district. The variable costs then represents how much health care or education
per individual is available.




v(gj) + y   ti (1)
The costs of providing public goods dier per district and its variation is captured by







ni + pigi if gi > 0
0 if gi = 0
(2)
We assume that all individuals in a district can choose the amount of public goods
district size, so that an individual in district i gets a benet njv(gj) of the public goods provided
in district j. In an Appendix we show that, when spillovers are indeed important, small districts
are more likely to get a bailout. The main results of our paper are thus robust to this alternative
specication.
7provided in their district. Since the individuals within a district are identical, how-
ever, we only have to look at the preferences of a single individual as these preferences
prevail for all individuals in the same district. The level of public goods provided in






v(gj) + y   ti (3)
where ti is given by (2). The non-cooperative Nash equilibrium outcome is charac-




v0(gi) = pi if v(gi) > F
ni + pigi
gi = 0 otherwise
(4)
From the rst-order condition (4) it follows that districts only provide local public
goods when district size is large enough compared to the economies of scale eect in
the provision of local public goods.
3 Eciency and grants
It is a common nding that in the form of decision making described in Section 2 the
spillover eect is not taken into account and that, therefore, underprovision of local
public goods occurs. A system of grants, however, can be used to achieve an ecient
8In this and in subsequent maximization problems the strict concavity of v(:) implies that the
rst order conditions are sucient. Moreover, the strict concavity implies that the solutions are
unique.
8Nash equilibrium without completely centralizing decision making. We assume that
such a system is implemented by a central government and that to nance this
system, individuals pay a national lump-sum tax T. In order to characterize such an
equilibrium, we rst characterize the optimal levels of local public good provision as a
benchmark for normative evaluation of equilibrium outcomes. Then we characterize
a system of matching grants that induces local governments to provide these optimal
levels of local public goods.
Since in this model the payos are quasilinear in the endowment, for eciency it
suces to focus on an outcome in which all individuals pay the same tax level. The
objective is to maximize the equally weighed sum of all individual utilities. The




j6=i njv(gi) + Ny   NT (5)







We dene ^ gi to be the socially optimal or ecient per-capita amount of public goods
if ^ gi satises the following rst-order condition of (5):
8
> > > > <






j6=i njv(^ gi) >
F + nipi^ gi
^ gi = 0 otherwise
(7)
9From the rst-order condition (7) it follows that it is only ecient to provide local
public goods when district size is large enough compared to the economies of scale in
local public good provision. A comparison of the rst-order conditions (7) with (4)
yields that there is indeed underprovision of public goods. Firstly, the strictly positive
levels of public goods in a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium are lower than the level
in an ecient outcome. Furthermore, the minimum district size for providing a
positive amount of the public good is smaller than in the ecient outcome.
In the following we consider a system consisting of matching (or conditional) grants.
The timing is now as follows.
1. The central government chooses a system of matching grants.
2. The local governments observe the system of matching grants and choose the
amounts of local public goods that will be provided.
Let mi denote the share of total spending the local government of district i can
reimburse. This reimbursement is chosen such that the marginal incentives to provide
local public goods are ecient. Again, districts have balanced budgets and therefore









(1   mi) if gi > 0
0 if gi = 0
(8)
and the national tax rate is given by
T =
P
jjgj>0 (F + pjnjgj)mj
N
(9)
10The level of public goods provided in a district i is then implicitly given by max-







v(gj) + y   ti   T (10)
The rst-order condition of this maximization problem is given by
8
> > > > <
> > > > :








(1   mi) +
(F+nipigi)mi
N
gi = 0 otherwise
(11)
From (7) and (11) it follows that the marginal incentives to provide local public
goods is optimal with the following conditional transfers ^ mi
^ mi =
N
ni + (N   ni)
(12)
The marginal incentives to provide public goods are now ecient, moreover, a com-
parison of the conditions in (7) and (11) with mi = ^ mi reveals that the decision
whether to provide public goods is now also ecient, that is gi = ^ gi for all i. An-
other feature of the transfer scheme characterized by (12) is that the transfers ^ mi do
not depend on the exact values of the pi's. Furthermore, when individuals choose gi
given matching grants ^ mi then ^ gi constitutes the unique Nash equilibrium outcome.
Finally, note that the above transfer scheme would be the outcome that a benevo-
lent, social-welfare maximizing, national government would choose. It is, however,
also the scheme individuals would choose in case they would vote ex-ante, without
11knowing their district sizes, over a transfer scheme. Although majority voting, with
knowledge of district sizes, might lead to a dierent transfer scheme, the result pre-
sented in the next section is stronger with the social-welfare maximizing transfer
scheme: Even with such a scheme, the ecient outcome will not always be obtained
when there is a soft budget constraint.
4 The soft budget constraint
In Section 3 we show that the rst-best outcome can be reached with matching
transfers. The motivation behind a system of matching grants is given by the benets
individuals outside a district get from the local public goods provided in this district.
The principle that a central government makes transfers to increase eciency creates,
however, another possibility. When a district does not provide any local public goods
at all, the central government could, with the same motivation as for the conditional
transfers, make a transfer to this district so that at least some public goods are
provided in this district so that people outside the district have the benets from
the spillovers. This motivation seems to be an essential feature of bailouts or soft
budget constraints. The bailout policy is thus carried out in the interest of those
individuals that are not located in the district needing a bailout. This leads to the
same outcome as with majority voting, that is when individuals vote over pairwise
comparisons of bailout levels.
We focus on the decision of the individuals in a single district i and in the analysis
we assume that all other districts choose the positive levels given in Section 3. Even
12when the central government is willing to give a district a bailout, the choice of the
individuals whether to induce such a bailout still depends on the increase in the
central tax level necessary to nance the bailout, and the amount of local public
goods provided in the district under a bailout. The decision on the bailout is taken
after the decisions on the amount of local public goods are made by the districts.
The timing is thus:
1. The central government chooses a system of matching grants.
2. The local governments observe the system of matching grants, choose the
amounts of local public goods that will be provided and choose whether to
induce a bailout.
3. The central government, observing the choices made by local governments,
decides on bailouts induced by local governments.
In the following analysis we look at this game recursively, that is rst at the central
government's bailout policy and then at the decision over local public goods provision
in district i. We assume that bailouts are costly, that is the central government has
to put eort in nding out what the local cost parameter pi is. The costs of this eort
are denoted by cBO. As already done for the system of matching grants, a majority
voting argument is also given for the central and local governments' policies.
4.1 Central government bailout policy
In this section we look at the reaction of the central government when the individuals
in a district choose a gi and thus a ti such that gi < ^ gi. Now the central government
13can intervene in district i's provision of local public goods gi by making a lump-sum
grant such that, per capita, an amount of local public goods in district i of gi+mi is
provided. We do not drop the assumption that budgets are balanced, so to nance
this transfer the central tax level is increased by nipimi=N. Finally, we assume that
bailouts are costly, that is additionally the central tax rate increases by cBO=N for
each bailout.
Given these assumptions, the central government maximizes the payo of an
individual located outside the district that might get a bailout, and this optimization
problem can be written as
max
mi
v(gi + mi)   TBO (13)







N if mi > 0
cBO
N if mi = 0
(14)
The rst-order condition of this maximization problem is given by
8
> > > > <
> > > > :






v(gi + mi) >
F+nipigi+cBO+nipimi tini
N
mi = 0 otherwise
(15)
A comparison of conditions (15) and (7) reveals that the amount of public goods
provided under the bailout policy is lower than the amount chosen by the individuals
14when there is a hard budget constraint. This implies that it is potentially costly for
individuals to induce a bailout - in case of a bailout there will be less local public
goods in their districts than they are willing to pay for. In the next subsection
we look in more detail at the decision whether individuals will induce a bailout.
In addition, from (15) it follows that when economies of scale in local public good
provision become more important, the central government is less likely to provide a
bailout.
Condition (15) makes it possible to characterize the central government's bailout
policy.
Lemma 1 There exist critical values ni;C, ti;C and gi;C such that:
1. if ni > ni;C the central government does not provide district i a bailout, even
when district i chooses a zero level of own-contribution to local public good
provision;
2. if ni < ni;C the central government provides a bailout to district i if and only
if ti > ti;C and gi < gi;C.
Proof of Lemma 1:
(1): From condition (15) it follows that when gi = 0 a necessary condition for mi > 0
is v0(0) >
nipi
N . Hence, for ni > ni;C =
Nv0(0)
pi the central government never provides
a bailout.
(2): Let gi;C be so that v0(gi;C) = nipi=N and ti;C =
F+nipigi+cBO+nipimi Nv(gi+mi)
ni .
Then for gi < gi;C it holds that v0(gi;C) > nipi=N. If in addition ti > ti;C then from
condition (15) it follows that the government will provide a bailout. 
15It follows from Lemma 1 that the willingness of the central government to provide
bailouts and district size are negatively related. As argued above, the willingness of
the central government to give a bailout is not sucient for a bailout to take place.
In the following section we therefore look at whether local governments indeed choose
to induce such a bailout.
4.2 Local government bailout policy
The central government bailout policy, implicitly given by condition (15), does not
fully characterize the occurrence of bailouts. The condition shows how and when a
district can induce a bailout from the center. This does not, however, imply that
such a bailout is attractive for a district. In other words, condition (15) is necessary,
but not sucient. Below we analyze the choice made by individuals in a district,
given the soft-budget constraint.
First note that, for any gi such that v0(gi) < nipi=N the district will receive no
bailout at all. In this case the optimal choice for the individuals in district i therefore
is ^ gi. Secondly, when gi is such that gi < ^ gi and as long as both conditions in the
rst line of (15) are met, it follows that the amount of local public goods provided
under a bailout is not aected by the value of gi. Individuals within the district that
induces a bailout naturally are interested in making their own contribution to local
public good provision as small as possible. An obvious way to do this is by choosing
gi = ti = 0.
It may then be the case, however, that although v0(0) > nipi=N the second
inequality of the rst line of condition (15) does not hold and district i would therefore
16not get a bailout when ti = 0. It can be, however, that although the second inequality
of the rst line of condition (15) does not hold for ti = 0, it holds for ti = F(1  ^ mi)=ni.
In the latter case individuals in the district that gets a bailout minimize their own
contribution by choosing ti = F(1  ^ mi)=ni and gi positive but innitesimally small.
We assume, however, that individuals in district i can only induce bailouts with
ti = 0. Note that if district i gets a bailout with ti = 0 then it would also get a
bailout with any ti > 0 and that we focus on the only type of bailouts one could
observe when there are no economies of scale in local public good provision.
In the remaining of this section we focus on a particular class of the payo functions
v(:), either v(g) = ln(g +1) or v(g) = g1 =(1 ) for 1
2   < 1. This implies that
v(:) should be "concave enough".
Individuals within district i prefer to induce a bailout with ti = 0 and T given by
expression (6) over an optimal level of public good provision gi = ^ gi when
v(mi) +
P











j6=i v(^ gj) + y  

F
ni + pi^ gi

(1   ^ mi)   T
which, using expressions (7), (12) and (15), can be rewritten as
v(^ gi)   v(mi) < v
0(^ gi)^ gi +
(N   ni)(1   )F






Condition (16) makes it possible to show how district size and the local government's
bailout policy are related.
17Lemma 2 There exists critical values ni;L such that if ni < ni;L and if the central
government is willing to give a bailout to district i, then the local government of
district i will induce a bailout.
Proof of Lemma 2: First note that when the central government is not willing to
give a bailout, the local government will not induce a bailout since the per-capita
costs of inducing would be cBO=N.
Secondly, look at the case with F = 0. The left-hand side of (16) then increases






































(ni + (N   ni))
2

and this inequality holds for pi  N=ni, and while from Lemma 1 we know that the
central government only provides bailouts when pi  Nv0(0)=ni = N=ni < N=ni,
it follows that inequality (17) holds for v(g) = log(g + 1).















and this inequality holds when 1
2 <  < 1 for possible value of , ni and N, so
inequality (17) holds for v(g) = g1 =(1   ).
18This leads to three possibilities when F = 0. Firstly, when (16) holds for all
possible ni then bailouts always take place, and this is the case when ni;L = N=2.
Secondly, when (16) does not hold for any ni then bailouts never take place and this
is the case when ni;L = 0. Finally, when neither of these two does hold, then by the
intermediate value theorem there exists an ni;L such that condition (16) holds if and
only if ni < ni;L.
Finally, when F 6= 0, then the only dierence is the term
(N   ni)(1   )F
N (ni + (N   ni))
and it is straightforward to show that this term is decreasing in ni. This implies that
a similar reasoning holds for F 6= 0. 
It follows from Lemma 2 that individuals are more likely to induce a bailout when
they are in a small district. Besides, from condition (16) it follows that an increase
in F makes it more likely that local governments induce a bailout. From Section 4.1,
however, it followed that the central government is less likely to give a bailout when
the economies of scale in local public goods provision are more important, that is,
when F is larger. It is therefore not clear how the economies of scale in local public
good provision is related to the occurrence bailouts.
195 Bailouts in equilibrium
The analysis in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 specied the bailout policies of the central
government and of the local government, respectively. In this section we argue that
these bailouts can occur in a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.
For tractability reasons, we make further assumptions to do this. In the rst
place we look at a specic utility function v(g) = g1 =(1   ) for  = 1=2 and at
cases where there are no economies of scale in local public good provision, so F = 0.
Secondly, except district 1 with size n1, districts are of equal size n. For the districts
of size n, all cost parameters are equal to pH while the possible values for the cost
parameter p1 of district 1 are pL and pH, with pL < pH, where Prob[p1 = pL] =
Prob[p1 = pH] = 1
2.
Now consider the following strategies:
Central government: Give each district an earmarked lump-sum trans-
fer equal to the amount of public goods that would be socially optimal
in that district if pi = pH and a matching grant given by expression
(12). When a local government induces a bailout, provide one when the
conditions of Lemma 1 hold.
Local government: Induce a bailout when the conditions of Lemmas
1 and 2 are met, otherwise provide an amount of the public good that
satises conditions (7).
20As argued above, there are majority voting arguments behind the strategies of the
central and local governments.
Conjecture 1 The above-mentioned strategies are, under certain parameter restric-
tions, the unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.
The crucial requirement for the above outcome to be a subgame-perfect Nash equilib-
rium is that the central government does not have an incentive to change the system
of matching grants to avoid bailouts. Recall that bailouts are costly from a social
welfare point of view, since less public goods than the socially optimal amount are
provided and since there are bailout costs cBO. A social-welfare maximizing central
government would therefore try to adjust the system of matching grants to avoid
bailouts. Note that districts with higher costs of public good provision provide less
of these goods. Bailouts can thus be avoided in all districts with pi = pH by giving
these district an earmarked lump-sum transfer equal to the amount of public goods
that would be socially optimal in that district if pi = pH. These transfers are ear-
marked in the sense that they have to be spent on local public goods. In addition to
that, districts get the matching grant given by expression (12). It is straightforward
to show that, in the absence of bailouts, these grants lead to the socially optimal
outcome.
Next to the matching grants there are now earmarked lump-sum grants. Lemma
1 and 2, however, are proven for the case in which there are no lump-sum grants. To
make sure we can still use the results of these lemmas, we only look at cases where no
lump-sum grant is given to district 1. We thus restrict our attention to those cases
21where it is not socially optimal to provide public goods in district 1 when p1 = pH,
and therefore no earmarked lump-sum transfer is given to district 1. This is the case
when district 1 is small enough. A more precise discussion of this can be found in
an Appendix.
The second possible adjustment of the system of grants would be to change the
matching grant ^ m1. This changes the incentives of district 1 to induce a bailout,
more specically, an increase in the matching grant m1 would decrease the incentives
to induce a bailout. When district 1 is small enough, however, a social-welfare
maximizing central government does not have an incentive to do this. A more precise
argument can again be found in an Appendix.
It follows that the central government does not have an incentive to deviate from
the system of matching grants ^ m if district 1 is small enough. This is similar to the
conditions lemmas 1 and 2 imply for bailouts to take place. For district 1 suciently
small, the above strategies are therefore indeed the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium
outcome, and bailouts can take place.
Finally, note that it is important which equilibrium concept one uses. In a
subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium players do not have the possibility to commit
to strategies. A social-welfare maximizing government thus cannot commit not to
provide bailouts, even though this would be welfare maximizing. The impossibility
of such a commitment is, in our view, another typical characteristic of bailouts.
226 Concluding remarks
There is much evidence, in developing as well as developed countries, that relatively
small subnational jurisdictions are more likely to be bailed out. Like Wildasin (1997),
the paper focuses on the relationship between size and soft budget constraints in a
model where positive externalities in the provision of local public goods motivates
grants and bailouts from the central government to subnational jurisdictions. We
extend the analysis by including economies of scale in local public good provision
and we get results that dier from previous contributions, but that are in line with
the evidence. From the model three broad conclusions emerge:
[1] The willingness of the central government to bail out a subnational jurisdiction
depends (a) negatively on the size of the jurisdiction and (b) positively on the exter-
nalities associated with local public good provision.
[2] The willingness of a subnational jurisdiction to induce a bailout and the size of
this jurisdiction are negatively related.
[3] Bailouts can occur in a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. As long as the sub-
national jurisdiction that might get a bailout is small enough, the prevention of a
potential bailout is too costly.
7 Appendix: Spillovers
In this appendix we show that the main results of the paper are robust for a dierent
specication of the spillover eect, namely that the spillover eect , is increasing in
the size of the district where the public good is provided. An individual in district i
23now gets a benet njv(gj) of the public goods provided in district j, (i 6= j). In a




njv(gj) + y   ti
where ti is given by (2). It is straightforward to show that the non-cooperative
equilibrium is again given by (4).





j6=i njniv(gi) + Ny   NT
where T is dened by (6). Let ^ gi again denote the socially optimal or ecient
outcome, where ^ gi satises the rst-order condition of this maximization problem:
8
> > > > <






j6=i njniv(^ gi) >
F + nipi^ gi
^ gi = 0 otherwise
(18)
A comparison of the rst-order conditions (18) with (4) yields that there is again
underprovision of public goods. As in Section 3, it is possible, however, to nd
a system of matching grants that induce the optimal outcome. Individuals choose
to provide the social ecient when the central government chooses the following
24matching transfers ^ mi
^ mi =
N
1 + (N   ni)
We now focus on soft budget constraints. As in Section 4.1, we rst analyze the cen-
tral government bailout policy. The central government maximizes the payo of an
individual located outside the district that might get a bailout, and this optimization
problem can be written as
max
mi
niv(gi + mi)   TBO
where TBO is given by (14). The rst-order condition of this maximization problem
is given by
8
> > > > <
> > > > :






niv(gi + mi) >
F+nipigi+cBO+nipimi tini
N
mi = 0 otherwise
(19)
Condition (19) makes it possible to characterize the central government's bailout
policy.
Lemma 3 There exist critical values i;C, ti;C and gi;C such that:
1. if  < i;C the central government does not provide district i a bailout, even
when district i chooses a zero level of own-contribution to local public good
provision;
252. if  > i;C the central government provides a bailout to district i if and only if
ti > ti;C and gi < gi;C.
Proof of Lemma 3: (1): From condition (15) it follows that when gi = 0 a
necessary condition for mi > 0 is v0(0) >
pi
N. Hence, for  < i;C =
pi
Nv0(0) the
central government never provides a bailout.
(2): Let gi;C be so that v0(gi;C) = pi=N and ti;C =
F+nipigi+cBO+nipimi Nniv(gi+mi)
ni .
Then for gi < gi;C it holds that v0(gi;C) > pi=N. If in addition ti > ti;C then the
government will provide a bailout. 
As in Section 4.2, we now focus on the local government's bailout policy. Individuals
within district i prefer to induce a bailout with ti = 0 and T given by expression (6)
over an optimal level of public good provision gi = ^ gi when
v(mi) +
P











j6=i njv(^ gj) + y  

F
ni + pi^ gi

(1   ^ mi)   T
which, using expressions (7), (12) and (15), can be rewritten as
v(^ gi)   v(mi) < v
0(^ gi)^ gi +
(N   ni)(1   ni)F






Condition (20) makes it possible to show how district size and the local government's
bailout policy are related.
Lemma 4 When  > 1=n1 there exists critical values ni;L such that if ni < ni;L
and if the central government is willing to give a bailout to district i, then the local
government of district i will induce a bailout.
26Proof of Lemma 4: First note that when the central government is not willing to
give a bailout, the local government will not induce a bailout since the per-capita
costs of inducing would be cBO=N.
Secondly, look at the case with F = 0. The left-hand side of (20) increases more





^ gi   v
0(mi)mi
When v(g) = log(g + 1) then this inequality can be rewritten as
[1 + (N   ni)](N   ni)
2N < pif[1 + (N   ni)]
2   Ng
and since pi  [1 + (N   ni)] for g  0, a sucient condition for this inequality to
hold is that  > 1
ni.
For v(g) = g1 =(1   ) expression (17) can be rewritten as
[1 + (N   ni)]
1= 2 < [N]
1= 1
and this inequality holds when 1
2 <  < 1 for values of  > 1
N.
This leads to three possibilities when F = 0. Firstly, when (20) holds for all possible
ni then bailouts always take place, and this is the case when ni;L = N=2. Secondly,
when (20) does not hold for any ni then bailouts never take place and this is the
case when ni;L = 0. Finally, when neither of these two does hold, then by the
intermediate value theorem there exists an ni;L such that condition (20) holds if and
27only if ni < ni;L.
Finally, when F 6= 0 the only dierence is the term
(N   ni)(1   ni)F
Nni (1 + (N   ni))
and since this is decreasing in ni, a similar reasoning holds for F 6= 0. 
8 Appendix: Bailouts in Equilibrium
First note that when v(g) = g1 =(1   ) for  = 1=2 and when it is ecient to




n1 + (N   n1)
n1p1
2






No earmarked lump-sum grant It is socially optimal to provide no public goods
in district 1 when p1 = pH if
n1v(^ g1) + (N   n1)v(^ g1)   n1p
H ^ g1 < 0 (21)
that is, when p1 = pH if pH > 2=n1. Since a district should consist of at least one
28individual a sucient condition is pH > 2.
No change in the matching grant The central government does not have an
incentive, from the social welfare point of view, to change the matching grant to
district 1 when for any matching grant m the expected payo is lower than for ^ m1.
There are two possible cases when the matching grant could be changed, one in which
individuals in district 1 start providing public goods when p1 = pH, and the other
in which this is not the case. For the rst case the government does not have an
















n1v(m1) + (N   n1)v(m1)   n1pLm1   cBO
	
and for the second case the government does not have an incentive to change the
matching grants if
n1v(g(L;m)) + (N   n1)v(g(L;m))   n1pLg(L;m) <
n1v(m1) + (N   n1)v(m1)   n1pLm1   cBO
(22)
where g(L;m) denotes the amount of public goods individuals in district i provide
when the matching grants are m and p1 = pL.
In case the matching grant diers from ^ m1, an amount of public goods is provided
in district 1 that diers from the ecient one, so the net aggregate payo from
providing public goods in district 1 decreases. From the discussion on earmarked
29grants it followed that n1 and pH are such that it is ecient to provide no public
goods in district 1 when p1 = pH. With (21) this implies that for all g(H;m) the
following inequalities hold
n1v(g(H;m)) + (N   n1)v(g(H;m))   nipHg(H;m) 
n1v(^ g1) + (N   n1)v(^ g1)   n1pH ^ g1 < 0
From this it follows that it is sucient to look at condition (22).
With a change in matching grants the central government tries to avoid a bailout.
A bailout is less attractive for individuals in district 1 when they get a higher match-
ing grant. On the other hand, however, the more the matching grant exceeds the
optimal grant ^ m1, the lower the net aggregate social welfare. That is, the left-hand
side of (22) is decreasing in m. The central government therefore tries to nd the
matching grant m such that individuals in district 1 are indierent between provid-
















It follows from Section 4.2 that bailouts are more attractive for individuals in smaller
districts, so the smaller the district the bigger the m that makes the individuals
indierent between providing public goods and inducing a bailout. The left-hand
side of inequality (22) is, however, decreasing in m while the right-hand side does
not depend on m, so an increase in m = m makes it more likely that this inequality
is satised and that it is optimal not to change the system of matching grants.
30Note that when p1 = pL and g(L; ^ m1) = ^ g1, inequality (22) is not satised for
any cBO > 0. When m = 1, however, inequality (22) can be written as







and is thus satised for some cBO > 0 since, by assumption, ni < N=2. As argued
above, a decrease in n1 increases m, so it follows from the intermediate value theorem
that there exists an n such that when n1 < n then the central government does
not have an incentive to change the matching grant to district 1.
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